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ABSTRACT 
The Standing Orders of New Zealand's House of 
Representatives were redrawn in 1996 after the advent of 
MMP (Mixed Member Proportional Representation) in 
Parliament. Standing Orders are the permanent rules or 
orders of the House: in the words of the current Speaker, 
(they) "are designed to maintain order and facilitate 
debate". 1 They are also the base upon which Parliament 
operates. 
1 
Standing Orders were established in New Zealand 's first 
Parliament in 185-1 (largely lifted from the procedures 
used in Britain's House of Commons) and they are 
frequently amended The most radical changes occurred in 
1951 when New Zealand's Parliament changed from a 
bicameral to unicameral system. Jn 1985, the Labour 
Government made several changes, particularly in 
reconstructing Select Committees but the 1996 changes 
are more significant. They substantially alter the way 
Parliament operates. 
This paper assesses the impact of these changes, 
highlighting the positive outcomes as well some of the 
anomalies and inconsistencies which have emerged It also 
attempts to judge whether the new Standing Orders have 
been modernised sufficiently to cater for multi-party 
Governments possible (and probable) under Jvflv!P. 
Conclusions are drawn that the legacy of two-party 
dominance of the House was hard to shake and, that while 
the changes were an honest attempt to accommodate 
interests of all parties under MMP, there is still some way 
to go before Standing Orders can be said to fit neatly the 
more difficult requirements of an MMP Parliament. 
1 Hon Doug Kidd, Radio New Zealand, 3 June, 1999. 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
Standing Orders (SO) can be amended at any time if the 
House gives notice of a motion to that effect. In 1993 New 
Zealanders voted by referendum to change the style of 
Government from FPP (First Past the Post) to M:MP. As 
promised, Parliament called for a Standing Orders 
Committee to be established 2 to review, and where 
necessary, amend SO to suit what was anticipated a 
Parliament based more on accommodating a range of party 
positions rather than on two-party Government/Opposition 
certainties. 
Chaired by the Speaker, this Committee comprised NIPs 
from the two main parties plus one Independent, 3 as well 
as the Clerk of the House of Representatives (also, clerk 
office staff), and specialist advisors. The Committee met 31 
times over the following three years, heard 54 public 
submissions,-+ and in May 1995, a subcommittee led by 
Speaker, the Hon. Peter Tapsell, visited five European 
M:MP Parliaments 5 to observe operative procedures and 
note constitutional issues in those countries. The group 
reported back, 6 its recommendations were adopted ( as is 
usual practice by agreement of the House as a whole) 7 and 
2 Unlike other Select Committees, the SO Committee is not a permanent Committee. 
3 Hon Winston Peters previously National NIP for Tauranga, became an Independent 
NIP for Tauranga, May 1993. Other personnel were: Hon Peter Tapsell (L) 
(Chairman), Hon David Caygill (L) Hon Dr Cullen (L), Hon Wyatt Creech (N) 
(replacing Hon Paul East November 1994), Jim Gerard (N), Hon Phil Goff (L), Peter 
Hilt (N), (replacing Hon Ruth Richardson, July 1994), Rt Hon Jonathan Hunt (L), 
Rt Hon Don McKinnon (N). 
4 Of the 54, 21 were from NIPs, several were from other Select Committees and the 
remainder from interested groups. 
5 Ireland, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Norway. 
6 Report of the Standing Orders Committee, NZ House of Representatives, 1995. 
Other than the MPs' review, two reports were commissioned by the Committee: 
(i) Financial Aspects of the European Parliaments by Peter Lorimer, Treasury, 325 . 
(ii) Constitutional Issues by Nicola White, Cabinet Office, 348. 
7 David McGee Parliamentary Procedure in New Zealand Government Print 
Publishers, 2 ed. 1994, 83 . 
the new SO came into effect with the start of the 1996 
session on February 20. 
Notwithstanding their functional base, the 1996 changes 
have had a significant impact on Parliamentary procedure -
the most obvious being the new system of proxy voting. 
They have also: 
* enhanced the Speaker's role 
* established a Business Committee 
* streamlined the legislative process for a bill's passage 
* introduced a crown financial veto 
* redefined the way Parliament operates under the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (by ensuring provisions on natural 
justice are adhered to) 
* changed entrenchment procedures 
* formalised and defined areas of contempt of the House 
* altered sitting times to provide a more even spread of 
sessions throughout the year. 
.., 
.) 
Many of these changes had been mooted well before MMP 
but had never materialised. The 1996 redraft was therefore 
an opportunity to reappraise substantive issues, such as 
how the natural justice provisions in the Bill of Rights 
affect Parliamentary proceedings. Political commentators 
noted the 1993 SO Committee "interpreted its mandate 
broadly and with confidence". 8 The Committee did make 
bold revisions - many of which had been long awaited. 
The idea of several wise people getting together to draft 
rules for their governance brings to mind the jurisprudential 
theory of John Rawls in 'A Theory of Justice' . 9 While 
there was always going to be a critical difference between 
his theory and Parliament's SO reality, the theory helps to 
give a framework for assessing the changes in SO. Rawls ' 
8 New Zealand Under lvfMP, Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeary, 
Nigel S Roberts, Auckland University & Bridget Williams Press, 1996, 84. 
9 John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy Harvard University A Theory of Justice , 
London Oxford University Press, 1973 . 
4 
ideal lO is that persons shaping 'just' principles for social 
organisation, should have no knowledge of their place in 
the future plan. In other words, they should be 'original 
actors,' able to leave their particular political, social and 
philosophical interests behind ( as Rawls describes it, behind 
a 'veil of ignorance') . The actors would then devise rules 
of justice based on two principles: liberty ( equal rights to 
every person) and the ability to curtail liberty in order to 
defend liberties. By coupling these two principles, Rawls 
acknowledges realism is part of the ideal; actors can 
individually aim for the best for themselves but at the same 
time be aware they might be in the disadvantaged position 
and so prepare for the worst. 11 
Without consciously following the Rawlsian philoposhy the 
SO Committee would have aspired to behave as if they 
were the 'original actors.' Drawn from the two main 
parties, the Committee had to subjugate any preference for 
the two-party system and prepare rules for a Parliament 
about which they had no working knowledge. The two 
largest parties believe now that this Committee did a fair 
job; the new rules are 'about right.' However larger third 
parties do not agree. They point out there are 
inconsistencies and anomalies in the new SO which clearly 
benefit the two large parties and disadvantage third parties. 
Further, despite all parties having the opportunity to make 
submissions to the current review of Standing Orders 12 it 
is predicted only minor changes will be made. The 
question is: do the 1996 SO favour those who mastered the 
plan? The answer appears to be yes. Whether this was 
lO John Rawls, Above n 9, 136-7. 
11 Hilaire McCoubry & Nigel White (Nottingham University) Textbook on 
Jurisprndence Blackstone Press Ltd, London 1993, 235-241. 
12 A Standing Orders Committee is meeting currently and its report is due out in 
October. Both the Speaker Hon Doug Kidd and Rt Hon Jonathan Hunt have said 
the Committee is making 'minor alterations' only. (This would discount altering the 
voting system) . 
13 S033. 
14 so 82. 
15 so 104. 
16 so 76 (1). 
intentional or an unexpected outcome is irrelevant. If there 
are inconsistencies these should be addressed. 
ANALYSIS OF THE KEY CHANGES 
TO STANDING ORDERS 
1. The Speaker's role and the Business Committee 
5 
The Speaker's position has been enhanced under the new 
Standing Orders. As well as controlling/administering 
parliament grounds and buildings, 13 maintaining order and 
decorum in the House, 14 and calling members for 
debate, 15 the Speaker now convenes and chairs the new 
Business Committee. 16 (See Below). 
Though not prescribed by Standing Orders, the Speaker's 
other key role is to chair the Parliamentary Services 
Commission. Established under the Parliamentary Services 
Act 1985, this role underpins the Speaker's status. For the 
purposes of the Parliamentary Finance Act, the Speaker is 
Minister of the House responsible for a substantial budget. 
The two roles (Speaker of the House and PSC) are quite 
separate. 17 
17 "The Speaker is Chairman of the Parliamentary Service Commission as well as 
being Speaker. While in the Chamber the Speaker is Speaker of the House, not the 
Chainnan of the Parliamentary Services Commission. (A point of order relating to 
correspondence with the Speaker as Chairman of PSC not permitted to be 
developed). Hansards, 1992, Vol. 532, 13236. Reported in Speakers' Rulings 
1867 to 1996 inclusive, Editors, various, including present Clerk, David McGee. 
1996, 13 . 
18 so 15-20. 
19 so 158. 
The process of appointing the Speaker is the same as 
before ( decided by acceptance, or when there are two or 
more candidates, by personal vote) . 18 While two main 
parties dominate the House, it is likely the Speaker will 
continue to be drawn from either one. The position is 
generally voted along party rather than personal lines. 
The Speaker's vote is now a deliberative rather than a 
casting vote. The Review Committee made this change to 
avoid disturbing the proportionality of Parliament and to 
reinforce the Speaker's independence in the House. (If a 
vote is tied, instead of providing the casting vote, the 
Speaker simply declares the question lost. 19 This has not 
been tested in the current ( 45th) Parliament). 
6 
The question of a Speaker's independence in the House is 
often debated. When the SO Committee looked at the issue 
it decided against the British/European Parliaments' 
custom of having the Speaker resign from the party once 
appointed to the position. Committee members felt the two 
roles (being an electorate MP, as well as Speaker), did not 
pose ' significant difficulties ' .20 However, there is potential 
for conflict because Speakers are not able to express 
opinions on policy or matters raised in the House. 
The present Speaker, Hon. Doug Kidd says the Speaker' s 
need to exercise discretion can be a serious restraint on 
his/her relationship with the electorate. By definition, an 
MP must satisfy their constituents to secure another term 
in office. Hon Doug Kidd notes the job of Speaker is ' high 
risk' . Looking at his predecessors over the last thirty years, 
none except Sir Roy Jack and Sir Richard Harrison have 
had more than a term as Speaker. However, this has mostly 
been due to other factors such as resignation, 
20 Report of the Standing Orders Committee, As above n 6, 13 . 
7 
retirement or death. 21 
To an extent, the MMP list system can ease the problem of 
having a Speaker perform as electorate MP as well as 
bi-partisan Speaker, because potential (or incumbent) 
Speakers can simply switch to being list MPs before an 
election. Parties will know their preferred Speaker in 
advance of an election 22 and ensure that candidate has a 
high list placing in the party. 
2. The Business Committee 
Similar to Britain's House of Commons Services Select 
Committee 23 , and modelled on committees serving MMP 
Parliaments visited in Europe, the Business Committee has 
been established to act as the House's Executive. 
Membership comprises representatives from all parties with 
more than six members, and smaller parties can nominate a 
representative between them. Its tasks include formally 
directing the flow and order of business, allocating 
debating time for parties and individuals, 2-l deciding on the 
length of debates and speaking times ( set out in Sessional 
Orders, February 1999), and deciding where the members 
sit in the House. 
21 Speakers: 1967-72 Sir Roy Jack, (Nat) lost seat with Party loss 
1972 - Alfred E Allen (Lab) died in office 
1973-75 Stanley Whitehead (Lab) lost seat with Party loss 
1976-77 Sir Roy Jack (Nat) died in office 
1977-84 Sir Richard Harrison (Nat) lost seat with Party loss 
1984-87 Gerald Wall (Lab) resigned 
1987-91 Kerry Burke (Lab) retired 
1991-93 Sir Robin Gray (Nat) retired 
1993-96 Hon Peter Tapsell (Lab) lost seat while in position as Speaker 
for the National Government 
1996-99 Hon Doug Kidd (Nat) . 
22 Rt Hon Jonathan Hunt has indicated his desire (June 3, 1999) to be Speaker 
should there be a Labour-led coalition Government after the 1999 election. 
23 Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament Butterworths, London. 21 st edition, Editor: CJ Boulton, 1989. 65 7. 
2-i so 76-80. 
25 so 77. 
The Committee certainly reflects the proportionality basis 
of an MMP Parliament. All substantial procedural matters 
( as well as membership of the Committee itself) are 
decided or divided according party proportionality. On its 
deliberations, the Speaker must seek unanimity - or near -
and in determining whether or not this is reached, must be 
satisfied the decision is fair, having regard to party 
representation in the House. 25 
8 
There is however, no fear that the apparent 'overly 
democratic' Committee will thwart Government's ability to 
govern because when a matter is not resolved, the 
Government effectively uses its majority in the House to 
make the determination. With this in mind ( and the fact the 
Opposition, when it is in power will wish the same 
courtesy), the Business Committee generally agrees to 
Government's agenda and responds reasonably to requests 
(for extensions of time, for example) . Meetings are 
generally short and predictable. 26 
At the beginning of this 45th Parliament, the Committee 
decided on the allocation of debating times in a 4/4/4 split 
between National, Labour and the smaller parties. This was 
an obvious division in the present Parliament. 27 The minor 
parties parley their allocation, normally on a two-way split 
with half supporting and half negating the bill under 
discussion. On a Government Bill, Sessional Orders grant 
12 speeches each lasting 10 minutes. A convention has 
now evolved whereby speeches can be further subdivided 
into 5 minute speeches if parties so decide. This convention 
26 Minutes of the BC meeting 1 June 1999, reveal the meeting took 9 minutes and 
agenda matters related to requests to extend reporting times for Bills. The first 
meetings in a Parliamentary Session would clearly be longer with Committee 
membership and procedural matters to establish. 
27 The ational Party has 44 seats, Labour, 37 and the minor parties make up the 
remaining 39 in the 120-member Parliament. 
has developed notwithstanding the SO requirement that 
leave of the House must first be sought. 
9 
The speaking allocations are designed to be proportionate 
and make for greater efficiencies in the debating chamber. 
On the latter, ACT leader Hon Richard Prebble believes 
this notion runs counter to the purpose of Parliament, 
whose primary objective is to check the executive's power. 
By definition, Parliament should be inefficient - debates 
should extend until the issue has been discussed to the 
satisfaction of the majority in the House. (The United 
States Senate has no time limits on its speakers). 
Parliament pays the price for efficiency on the floor -
discussions are limited but the Government ' s programme is 
less likely to be held up. According to the Clerk, the SO 
Review will probably address this issue, although a more 
flexible approach would most likely apply for particular 
and possibly named debates only. 
At present if a member is not granted permission to speak 
by the Business Committee, there is an opportunity to 
request time from the Speaker while the debate is in 
progress. Under SO 105, when two members rise to speak, 
the Speaker decides who has the right to be heard, basing 
the call on SO 105 ' s provisions: (a) if possible, a member 
from each party should be able to speak in each debate 
(b )overall participation should be approximately 
proportional to party membership ( c) priority to party 
spokespersons in order of size of party and ( d) the 
consideration should be taken of individual members ' 
seniority and expertise. 
The proportionality appears fair . However, Hon Peter 
Dunne contends the four requirements do not necessarily 
work together. During a recent debate on the Fire Service 
Commission,28 the Business Committee did not at first 
28 Weekly Hansards No. 73 , 19 May 1999, 16529. 
grant him speaking rights and when he took his chance on 
the floor, he was still not given speaking time. He raised a 
point of order (SO 105 (a) and (d)) 29 and was finally 
granted permission to enter the debate. 
10 
The incident highlights the potential anomaly between SO 
105's subsections. It also reminds members that the 
decision on how the debate is played out in the House is 
finally the Speaker's domain, not the Business 
Committee's. Speaker Hon Doug Kidd 30 says decisions 
over who has the right to speak come down to a balancing 
exercise. He believes there is broad satisfaction with the 
way he calls speakers to debate although acknowledges the 
process is not an exact science, and the calls may not 
always be able to reflect exact factions . In making a 
decision (or ruling), the Speaker says he is not only guided 
by SO 2 (applications of Standing Orders) but also by his 
experience of the political system and requirement to be 
fair. 
Recommending appointments to Select Committees is 
another function of the Business Committee 31 though in 
practice, parties organise their own candidates and arrange 
to support each others' candidates. The Committee also 
has power to stop Bills proceeding to Select Committees 
even when the House has agreed they should proceed. 32 
In this case the bill passes straight onto the third reading. 
33 On balance, :MPs agree the Business Committee works 
well. Opposition parties are alerted to the House ' s business 
and Government is alerted to likely resistance in advance. 
29 Hon Peter Dunne has been in Parliament since 1984 and is among the 20 most 
senior members in the House. In the present coalition Government, he is Minister of 
Revenue and Internal Affairs. 
30 Interview with Hon Doug Kidd, 17 June, 1999. 
31 so 188(2), 191 . 
32 so 293 . 
33 See Appendix ' Passage of Bills through Parliament. ' 
34 so 145. 
35 so 146. 
36 so 149. 
11 
3. Voting 
A key change in the new Standing Orders has been the 
method of voting. Bells which used to precede the vote 
have been abolished in favour of a two-layered voting 
system, by voice in the first instance, 34 and then (if the 
parties wish), a party vote. 35 If voting is close, ( or on 
matters of conscience), a personal vote can be requested 36 
although there must be more than 20 people in the debating 
chamber for this to occur. Members asserting suspicious 
votes can call for a personal vote though the Speaker rarely 
grants this demand. The fact that votes are received in 
written form means a personal vote ( after the party vote) is 
generally unnecessary. Personal votes are still taken on 
issues involving matters of conscience (such as liquor 
licensing and gambling) and are now called 'personal' 
rather than conscience votes. 
The number of times party ( and personal) votes have been 
taken by the Committee of the whole House this 
Parliament (997) is twice that of the previous Parliament 
( 495). 37 The 1998/99 provisional figure alone is 540 
votes for the Committee of the Whole House, whereas 
second reading debate votes for the same period is 129. 
There is usually a greater volume of legislation in an 
election year, but by comparison, the 1995/96 ' election 
year' debates only called for 101 votes for the Committee 
of the whole House. No analysis has been conducted on 
why this should be the case but one could surmise that 
there is greater scrutiny at the Select Committee process 
yielding more amendments on which to vote. Had the old 
37 Figures are from the Annual Reports of the Office of the Clerk. The 1998/99 figure, 
incorporated in the Session total, is provisional, and also supplied by the Clerk's 
office. 
voting system been in place (the eight-minute division bells 
voting time) an absurd amount of debating time would 
have been consumed in the voting process this year. 
12 
The new voting system allows for party whips to submit 
votes on behalf of the total number of:MPs they have in 
Parliament, so long as 75% of their members remain in the 
precincts. The remaining absent 25% cast proxy votes. 38 
Members must give the proper authority for proxy votes 
and can also record a proxy abstention if they wish. For 
minor parties, these proxies can be allocated to another 
party of their choice and every party ( even with a 
membership of one), is entitled to a minimum of one proxy. 
Advantages of the proxy system 
* Overcomes the problem of having :MPs in the House at 
all times. The informal 'pairing' mechanism (when an 
absent member counted on an opposition member not to 
vote during a division would not work under :ivflv1P). 
* Members are elected on party lines, and are expected to 
vote accordingly. The debating chamber is simply the 
place to air party views, not to change members' minds 
about an issue: the party vote carries the day. The Proxy 
system merely formalises the obvious. 
* Voting is quick (one minute compared with up to eight). 
Deputy Prime Minister Wyatt Creech described the old 
voting system as a "pointless activity".39 
* The whips can organise members' availability well in 
advance of the week, (usually by Tuesday morning) and 
members can also plan in advance to be absent. 
38 so 160(2). 
39 Hon Wyatt Creech' s observations as Leader of the House addressing Canterbury 
University, Aug. 1996. Reprinted in Philip Joseph' s Constitutional Law, NZLR 
( 1997), 221. 
Disadvantages of the proxy system 
* The 25% absent member restriction penalises 
middle-sized minor parties, such as The Alliance, New 
Zealand First and ACT. These parties must ensure they 
always have 9, 6 or 5 members respectively in the 
House at any time, otherwise their proxies are 
disallowed. This can be difficult to achieve 
( especially allowing for unforeseen absence) and 
restricts electorate and national commitments by these 
parties. 
13 
* A party of one member is better off than a party of two, 
(three, four, five etc) because it can always cast a 
proxy vote 40 and is free to request to be absent at all 
times. The other small parties are constrained by the 
75% requirement and are arguably disadvantaged 
(proportionately) by having to remain in the House 
precincts. 
* Members who declare themselves Independent can 
offer proxies without having to worry about being in 
the precincts of Parliament. Even when a party has 
registered as such with the Electoral Commission, 41 as 
long as the individual members remain as Independents 
they can still submit proxy votes en masse and on party 
policy. Speaker Hon Doug Kidd notes all members 
must still must apply for absence from the House and 
leave is granted on two grounds only: 
(a) illness or other family cause of a personal nature 
40 so 160(2). 
41 Mauri Pacific registered with the Electoral Commission as a party on 12 February 
1999. However, its five MPs remain as Independents because they have not 
informed the Speaker of the party's Parliamentary membership [SO 34 (2)]. They 
can therefore use their proxy votes to vote with Government ( or Opposition) while 
being out of the House. The disadvantages of not being recognised by the Speak er 
is lack office allowance and other bonuses provided under the Parliamentary 
Services Act. 
-1-2 so 38. 
(b) to enable MPs to attend other public business (NZ 
or overseas).42 
The wider interpretation of 'family' can encompass 
many situations. 
Who checks attendance in the House? According to 
representatives from all parties, there is potential for 
breach. To date, there has been one instance when a 
party was 'caught out.' This was the ACT party, which 
upon realising its mistake, alerted the Speaker and the 
voting record was corrected. The system comes down to 
trust and works by mutual interest and the 'balance of 
terror.' -1-3 
14 
There was also certain merit in 'turning up' to vote. Under 
the former system their presence gave MPs a chance to mix 
with colleagues, and be seen to participate. MPs are 
arguably more isolated from each other now and this can 
work against 'team' spirit and general affability within the 
House. 
A further point against the new voting system is the 
possibility for MPs to vote on Bill changes of which they 
are completely unaware. When a Bill is brought back to the 
House, a myriad of recommendations may have 
considerably altered the original Bill. A member (or party) 
who has already assigned a proxy vote(s) might not even 
agree with these changes. 
4. Legislative Procedures for the passage of Bills 
In previous Parliaments, Governments have been able to 
group into one Bill, entirely umelated amendments to a 
number of Acts for the purpose of speeding up the 
43 Hon Doug Kidd, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 17 June 1999. 
legislative process. These were the ' omnibus Bills' and 
normally non-controversial . While a seemingly efficient 
way of dealing with minor reforms the SO Review 
Committee decided the practice was not satisfactory as 
more controversial reforms were being ' fast-tracked ' 
without the opportunity for public input. 44 As a result, 
SO 256 requires a Bill must relate to one subject area only 
(though it) may make consequential amendments to a 
number of Acts affected by its provisions. The Speaker 
scrutinises each Bill to ensure the Standing Order is 
complied with. 45 
(a) Streamlining Debate 
15 
To make the passage of Bills easier, a new SO 273(1) has 
eliminated the introductory debate when a Bill is first 
brought to the House. There is still provision for 
introductory debates for an Appropriation Bill, Imprest 
Supply Bill or a Bill whose passage is accorded urgency, 46 
but the Bill's second reading ( on the third sitting day 
following) 47 is now the main debate (Appendix 1). The 
Select Committee to which the Bill is referred then 
recommends amendments or decides to pass it in the form 
in which it was introduced into the House. 48 
The benefits of the new system are obvious: 
* The system eliminates repetition (two debates on the 
same Bill before Select Committee consideration). 
* Members have a better opportunity to understand the 
issues before the debate takes place. 
44 Report of the Standing Orders Committee, As Above, n6, 49. 
45 SO 257 . Note: some omnibus Bills are still allowed - for example Finance or 
Confirmation Bills authorising illegal action, local legislation affecting particular 
localities, Maori Purposes Bills, Reserves & Land Disposal Bills and Statute 
Amendment Bills . 
46 SO 273(4) . Note: SO on matters requiring U rgency remain unchanged. 
47 so 278. 
48 so 282 . 
* Select Committees are better informed of Parliament's 
intentions. This avoids wasting Select Committee time 
if Government intends to discard the Bill. -+9 
16 
It was hoped the changes would also improve the quality 
of the debate 50 and a crude sample of members 51 say this 
has generally occurred. The quality of work now coming 
through the Select Committees is also regarded as being of 
a higher standard. (The Clerk' s office notes the volume of 
public submissions coming through has increased 
dramatically - a Bill at present has attracted 6000 - which 
could indicate the Public's faith in the Select Committee 
process). The perceived higher standard of work could be 
due to MPs' greater expertise ( and qualifications) in their 
fields of interest. Also Committee membership is more 
evenly spread among parties. 
The latter point is significant for other reasons. Under FPP, 
when Government had a majority on Select Committees, 
the House would nearly always agree (by its Government 
majority) on a Committees' majority ruling. This is not the 
case under :MMP and often the House will not agree with 
the majority view of the Select Committee. When this 
occurs (most often with Private and Members Bills), the 
Bill will not proceed. 
Another change is that Bills must be reported back to the 
House within six months unless the House (for a 
Government Bill) or the Business Committee extends this 
time. 52 Members have an opportunity to scrutinise 
changes as amended Bills are reprinted and available when 
the Select Committees report back to the Clerk. The 
49 ConstUutionaf Law, Philip Joseph, ( 1997) NZLR, 223 . 
50 Report of the Standing Orders Committee, As Above n6, 53 . 
51 Six MPs representing National (John Carter), Labour (Rt Hon Jonathan Hunt), 
Alliance (Jim Anderton), ACT (Richard Prebble), United (Hon Peter Dunne), and the 
Speaker (Rt Hon Doug Kidd), were asked to assess the standard of debate. 
52 so 284-286. 
53 so 290, 293 . 
considered Bill is debated by the whole House ( clause by 
clause) on the third sitting day following its presentation. 
If the House does not agree a Bill should proceed it is 
immediately discharged. 53 Government or Members' Bills 
introduced during an adjournment can, if the Business 
Committee agrees, be automatically referred to a Select 
Committee. The main debate on these Bills therefore takes 
place after a Committees' consideration. 
(b) More or Less Legislation? 
17 
Streamlining a Bill's passage was designed to speed 
matters up, though the SO Committee was determined to 
ensure "legislative solutions to problems be a last resort, 
not a first reaction" ( and the process) "should be onerous 
enough to discourage resort to it unless it is really 
necessary." 5-+ The SO changes have provided a more 
efficient legislative process but there are still the same 
number of Bills going through the House. Compared to the 
44th Parliament, where the Government Bills receiving 
Royal Assent was 418, 55 in this Parliament to date, there 
have been 387 Government Bills (59 are still with the 
House or its Committees). 56 
5. The Crown's Financial Veto 
In the past a private member was unable to move any 
proposal which involved even minor expenditure unless the 
Government agreed and approval had been sought from the 
Governor-General. Called the 'appropriation rule', the SO 
Committee considered this unfair and inconsistent with the 
Select Committees' authority which allowed them to 
54 Report of the SO Committee, Above n6, 53. 
55 Parliamentary Bulletin 96.20 (20 December 1996) Clerk's Office, House of 
Representatives. 
56 Parliamentary Bulletin 99.13 (21 June 1999). 
recommend costly amendments not requiring Government 
approval . 57 The rule was therefore removed in the 1996 
Standing Orders, with the rider that a Private Member's 
Bill (now referred to as a Member's Bill 58) can only be 
introduced if the impact on Government expenditure is 
minor. The Government of the day decides what it regards 
as minor. If the Bill is seen to impact on the fiscal 
aggregate, the Government may use this veto . 59 
The Treasury 60 reports the measure has been used rarely 
in the last Parliament. These occasions were (i) Casino 
Control Bill, December 1997 (this became a conscience 
vote but fiscal implications for the Government meant it 
could still induce the veto), (ii) Taxation Bill relating to 
Life Insurance and Superannuation 1998, and (iii) 
Recommendations in the ACC Bill, 1988. 61 
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The financial veto is really a tool of last resort because 
Government can vote down Member' s Bills with fiscal 
implications without ever having to resort to the Veto 
provision. Where there are many amendments, it might be 
easier ( as in the case (iii) above) 62 for Government to wait 
until the amendments have been debated and then veto all 
Amendments together. 
In any event, most Member' s Bills do not get to the debate 
stage, having been voted down at their introduction. A 
57 Report of the Standing Orders Committee , Above n 6, 61 . 
58 SO 252 (Classification of Bills) states: (a) a Government Bill is a bill dealing with a 
matter of public policy introduced by a minister (b) a Member' s bill - deals with a 
matter of public policy but introduced by a member who is not a Minister ( c) a local 
Bill is promoted by a local authority which affects a particular locality, ( d) a private 
Bill is promoted by a person or body of persons, for the particular benefit of that 
person(s) . 
59 so 313-317. 
60 Information supplied by Peter Wilson, Director of Tax Policy and Systems, The 
Treasury. 
61 The Bill became the Accident Insurance Act 1998. 
62 The Government ' s supporting party ACT voted with the Opposition on the Bill. 
63 so 314. 
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Member's Bill before the House at present (Laila Harr~'s 
Paid Parental Leave Bill) has fiscal implications for the 
Government (impacting on government servants), so the 
Bill's fate will be interesting to follow. It may become a 
personal vote but the Government can still veto the 
outcome if it can provide certification which states "with 
some particularity the nature of the impact on the fiscal 
aggregate or aggregates concerned and the reason why the 
Government does not concur in the change" (of the Bill) .63 
The Cabinet Office has instructed Government 
Departments to monitor developments in the House and 
Committees to assess fiscal effects of a Bill or 
Amendment(s). 6-1- This forewarning enables Government 
to defend its use of the Financial Veto. Further, SO 317 
(1) requires members intending to propose an amendment 
with fiscal implications to lodge this with the Clerk' s office 
24 hours before the House meets on the day the 
amendment is to be discussed. 
Political commentators in 1996 65 anticipated there would 
be few disruptions to the Government's spending 
programme as a result of Members' ability to introduce 
Bills with even minor fiscal implications. This is clearly the 
case. In the present Parliament to date, 59 Members Bills 
have been introduced and only three have received Royal 
Assent. All were Amendments and none have financial 
consequences associated with them. 66 However, the 
provisions in SO 313-317 still give encouragement to 
Members to persevere with policies or proposals which 
have fiscal impact. 
64 Phil Joseph, Constitutional Law NZLR (1997), 222. 
65 Boston, et al . Above n8, 84. 
66 These were all Amendments: (1) Education (Tertiary Students Association 
Voluntary Membership Amendment 1998), (2) Misuse of Drugs Amendment 1997 
(3) Trade in Endangered Species Amendment 1997. 
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The SO Committee noted the SO concerning the financial 
veto does not fit with the requirements of section 21 of the 
Constitution Act 1986 67, which says the Crown must 
recommend to the House all Bills involving appropriation 
or expenditure. An interim sessional order to 
accommodate the inconsistency was suggested at the time 
for the Minister to, in effect, recommend that the Bill and 
its appropriation be accepted by the Crown. However, no 
such sessional order has been written so it is as well, the 
circumstances have yet to arise for this inconsistency to be 
tested. 
6. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
and Natural Justice 
Despite literature to the contrary, (in the words of Paul 
Rishworth), New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act 1990, is"the 
Bill of rights you have when you also want parliamentary 
supremacy," 68 Parliament acknowledges its functions are 
bound by the Bill ofRights Act 1990. Parliament now 
interprets 'legislature' in s3 (a) as referring not only acts 
done by the legislature but also to the functioning of the 
House. 69 This position was taken only after the release of 
the Interim Report of the Finance and Expenditure 
Committee following the 'Wine Box Inquiry.' 70 The 
Select Committee decided that s 2 7 of the Act, ( every 
person has the right to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice) should be followed in Parliamentary 
proceedings. 
67 Report of the SO Committee, Above n6, 65 . 
68 Rights and Freedoms, Affirming the Fundamental Values of the Nation, G Huscroft 
& P Rishworth (eds), Brookers, Wellington 1995, 80, 102. 
69 Report to the standing Orders Committee on Natural Justice, Philip Joseph, 
September 1995, reported in Report of SO Committee, Above n6, 215 . 
70 Interim Report on the Income Tax Amendment Bill AJHR 1994 l .3C. The Wine 
Box Inquiry, set up in 1994, investigated allegations of corporate tax fraud . 
71 so 217-218 . 
72 so 260. 
As a result, (and after recommendations from Philip 
Joseph's Report on Natural Justice to the SO Committee), 
the 1996 SO have included provisions which are designed 
to protect an individual's reputation. Standing Order 226 
(1) allows a person to be informed about allegations made 
during a Select Committee hearing which may seriously 
damage their reputation, and (2) have the right to respond 
to these allegations. Standing Orders 237 - 239 allows 
witnesses 'reasonable access' to this material regardless of 
its nature although the Committee decides whether or not 
the information is delivered. 
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Witnesses called to Select Committees now formally have a 
right to counsel. This was accepted procedure before 1996, 
but the new SO 230 outlines the nature of this assistance. 
On questions of bias, the SO Committee followed the 
recommendations put forward in Phil Joseph' s Report that 
members must declare their position in advance of Select 
Committee consideration. If the member has made an 
allegation of crime or expressed a view on someone' s 
conduct, they may not participate on the Select Committee 
hearing. Any complaint of apparent bias must be made in 
writing to the Chairperson, and if the complainant is not 
satisfied with the Chairperson's decision, the matter can be 
referred to the Speaker for decision. 71 
A further change with regard to the Bill of Rights Act 
1990, is a requirement that a request under s7 (for the 
Attorney General to bring to the attention of the House a 
Bill which appears inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act 
1990), be made in writing. 72 The Attorney General must 
now present a paper for publication by the order of the 
House and include as much detail as possible of the 
reasoning behind any inconsistencies found . 
7. Entrenchment procedures 
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A possible constitutional issue arises with SO 261 which 
states that a proposal to entrench provisions in a Bill must 
be carried by more than a bare majority. This alters the 
constitutional entrenchment procedures in the House, 
which accepts that a bare majority can make legislation. A 
Bill with entrenchment provisions must therefore be passed 
by the same majority the entrenchment provision calls for. 
In effect, this allows a present Parliament to bind future 
Parliaments. This runs completely counter to the rules of 
Parliamentary Supremacy and would obviously have 
significant constitutional impact in New Zealand ' s 
Parliament. However, the supremacy doctrine would 
out-manoeuvre Parliament ' s attempts to exploit its 
legislative powers. In any event, the entrenchment 
procedure has yet to be tested in the House. 73 
8. Behaviour in the House 
When Parliamentarians come under attack from the public 
for being too boisterous, difficult, obstructive and rude, the 
members will defend their ' behaviour' by declaring the 
obvious - that Parliament is a debating chamber, not a 
Boardroom. Generally :MPs 74 believe their behaviour is no 
worse or better since the new SO. In fact the SO 
Committee made no recommendations on behavioural 
matters, except to note it supported the Speakers' attempts 
to discourage ' patsy' questions. 75 Hon Doug Kidd 
73 Philip Joseph, Above n 49, 225 . 
74 :MPs canvassed by the writer. Above n 51. 
75 A ' patsy' question is a device used by a Government backbencher which allows a 
Minister to ' answer' a question put, but which is merely self-congratulatory and an 
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indicated his intolerance of the practice in April this year.76 
The Speaker says the behaviour is not "so bad" during the 
normal course of debate and question time. One should 
expect outbursts 'occasionally' because of the tremendous 
tension between two ( or more) groups of people contesting 
for the right to govern. The public, he says, hears the worst 
of it because the most outrageous behaviour catches the 
media's attention. 
The Speaker's patience is still tested. One does not have to 
read far into the Hansard reports to find statements such as 
"so often we see standards reduced to the floor of the 
basement" .. and .. . "we do have an inability like none to 
control ourselves. We are all over the place. I wonder what 
the public thinks about that." 77 
9. Parliamentary Privilege 
The Parliamentary Privileges Committee tries to ensure the 
right to freedom of speech is exercised responsibly. The 
Speaker, Hon Doug Kidd says despite the quasi-judicial 
look to the Privileges Committee, it is a purely political 
facility with its members reflecting Parliament ' s 
proportionality. Where a decision is not reached over 
privilege complaint, the matter is referred back to the 
House and Parliament itself will decide on whether the 
conduct breached rules of the House. 
Various new SO concerning privilege were introduced in 
the 1996 changes and several comply with the natural 
opportunity to air the Government's achievements. 
76 Hansards, Vol 566, 3/3/99. "In the past patsy questions used to be indulged as long 
as there were not too many ...... but after hours and hours of debate, and the House is 
expected to sit in silence to hear things that all members have heard umpteen 
times ... .is it any surprise I have difficulty in controlling the House. The impossible 
ought not to be asked of me." 
77 Hansards Vol. 566, 24 February 1998. 6700 "Questions for Oral Answer" 
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78 so 389. 
79 so 394. 
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justice criteria. For instance, an allegation of breach must 
be formulated precisely to give the person against whom it 
is made, a full opportunity to respond to it. 78 Also the 
maker of the allegation may not serve on the inquiry 79 and 
permission of the House is not required for reference to be 
made to proceedings before a court (though these are 
always subject to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights which 
prohibits the impeaching or calling into question in a court 
of such proceedings). 80 
However, the Privileges Committee has its own rules when 
it comes to complaints of bias or misleading the Committee 
during the course of a hearing. Such a complaint can be 
lodged with the Speaker, who generally refers the 
complaint back to the Privileges Committee. The circular 
route is not a guarantee the matter will be dealt with fairly 
as the Committee itself will decide whether the allegation is 
a matter into which it will inquire. Proceedings of the 
Committee are not recorded as a matter of course (indeed, 
it is optional for Select Committees under SO 235, to 
record/transcribe evidence during hearings), so the House 
cannot be sure the allegation was either accepted for 
discussion let alone considered. 
Examples of contempt are now coded (modelled on 
Erskine May) though the 19 areas of contempt listed are 
indicative, not exhaustive. 81 Five matters have been 
referred to the Privileges Committee in this session to 
date 82 compared with three matters in the previous 
Parliament. 83 It is difficult to conclude whether the near 
doubling of instances has a direct bearing on the existence 
80 Privy Council ruling in Prebble v Television New Zealand [1994] 3 NZLR 1. 
81 The Clerk's office advises the list was never designed to be exhaustive because 
Parliament would not wish to restrict itself to a conclusive list. 
82 Information from the Clerk's Office. 
83 Journal of the House ofRepresentatives, Vo! 3, 1993-1999. 161. 
84 Above n 12. 
of a code ( definitions making contempt easier to identify), 
or whether this particular Parliament - with its greater 
numbers - is merely more prone to contemptuous 
behaviour. 
Conclusion 
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Rewriting a set of rules for a parliamentary system yet to 
operate was a challenge for the 1996 SO Committee and 
judging from views of those who work by them, the 
Committee formulated a fairly satisfactory set of new rules. 
The principles seem right. However, some of the new rules 
need correcting, particularly those which disadvantage 
third parties. 
The voting system is one area which calls for scrutiny. 
Apart from saving time, which is a substantial advantage, 
there are several disadvantages with the proxy vote -
particularly for the smaller parties. The situation whereby a 
party oflndependents can have as many proxies as it can 
get approval for, clearly needs to be tightened to ensure 
other small parties are not disadvantaged. Although this is 
an area which needs to be addressed, it is unlikely the new 
SO review will make any changes to voting. 84 
The Financial Veto, which for the most part was designed 
to offer encouragement to members to persevere with their 
Bills, clearly has limitations. While it is rare for Oppositions 
to get their policies through the House, it ought to be 
difficult for Governments to quash a member's Bill which 
has wide public appeal, albeit with minor financial 
implications. However, Governments can simply vote the 
Bill out before it reaches the stage of requiring the veto, or 
they can devise their own 'matching' Bill to appease the 
public. 85 Members Bills can also be stalled. MP Phillida 
Bunkle in trying to get a Casino Bill through the House, 
found that the day the Bill's debate was due to take place, 
was the day the Queenstown Casino Licenses were 
granted. She noted "the Government has used every 
Parliamentary device to block (the Bill's) coming forward 
to give us a vote." 86 Over a matter of conscience ( or 
personal vote), this was interesting timing on the 
Government's behalf 
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Committing the House to natural justice principles was a 
positive move and brings the House in line with the 
requirements of the Bill ofRights Act 1990. However, 
there are still loopholes in the SO relating to natural justice. 
What is deemed to be confidential in a Select Committee 
hearing? At present the rule is a Committee can hear 
evidence 'in private' if a person's reputation might be 
damaged by this evidence. The sensitive material then 
becomes the property of the Committee, until it is reported 
to the House - which hardly makes the information 'private 
or confidential' . It is all very well to have access to 
incriminating information to which (at the Speaker' s 
discretion) one has a right to respond to . But allegations, 
once made, even if incorrect are difficult to shake off. 
Of course the rules of Parliamentary Supremacy established 
in the Bill of Rights 1688, mean Parliament has authority to 
access any information and use this as it wishes within the 
House. But this point should be made clear to witnesses -
whatever is given in ' confidence' is still accessible to a 
large number of people (the whole House) . 
85 On May 5, 1999, the Government introduced a Taxation (Parental Tax Credit) Bill 
which had a second reading, committal and assent within four days. By contrast, a 
Member's Bill - Paid Parental Leave Bill - was introduced on 2nd February 1999 
but waited for its second reading until 9 September, 1999. 
86 Weekly Hansards No. 76, 17451. 
Witness protection should therefore be more assured. The 
House could use the Australian Senate model which 
compares favourably to New Zealand's when it comes to 
protecting witnesses before the House. Australian Senate 
Practice allows for witnesses who have been punished for 
contempt ( due to failure to appear before the Senate), to 
seek judicial review of the penalty, on the basis that failure 
to appear did not obstruct the Senate. 87 The Senate 
Practice notes however, that this course of action is 
unlikely to succeed except in exceptional circumstances. 
But the mere fact of the possibility is a step closer to 
natural justice than we see in New Zealand's Parliament, 
which does not allow any judicial review of its own 
proceedings (potentially possible under Section 27 of the 
Bill ofRights Act 1990). 
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The Australian Senate offers witnesses the same protection 
and legal status as it does members and will use its powers 
to protect witnesses against adverse consequences arising 
from their giving evidence. 88 There is similar protection in 
New Zealand while the matter is in the House (giving 
evidence in the House is absolutely privileged under Article 
9 of the Bill ofRights 1688), but once in the public 
domain, the Select Committees cannot grant immunity 
from investigation or conviction. 
Parliamentary Privilege is not an area which is likely to be 
reviewed - despite concerns, particularly from smaller 
parties, about the way the House runs this Committee and 
the potential for unfairness. 
87 Odger 's Australian Senate Practice 7th ed, Harry Evans, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra 1995, 434. 
88 The "action of a witness in giving evidence and producing documents and the 
evidence given therefore cannot be used against the witness in any sense in 
subsequent proceedings before a court or tribunal" (Australian Senate Practice, 
Ibid) . 
89 Above n 12. 
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Some :MPs would like to have tighter controls on 'question time', 
arguing that the present SO give Ministers too much freedom to 
avoid accountability. SO 378 requires Ministers to provide an 
answer which addresses the question "if it can be given 
consistently with the public interest." The question is: if a Minister 
declines to answer at all, how can the House (more precisely the 
Speaker), determine whether the matter is in the public's interest? 
The minister alone is making that judgement by not answering and 
therefore exercising executive powers over the legislature. 
The present Standing Orders thoroughly overhauled many 
Parliamentary procedures, but they were obviously written 
by Members grounded in the two party system. From the 
Rawlsian perspective, the Committee was not entirely 
behind the 'veil of ignorance' - they were too steeped in the 
system from which they came to be objectively fair to the 
new players. If this is unjust criticism then third parties 
would not be anxious to change the present Standing 
Orders. 
The hallmark of the new SO is proportionality, but it 
surprising how this can be overridden. Third parties still 
feel the weight of two-party dominance in Parliament. As 
the Speaker Doug Kidd notes, few changes will emerge 
after the next review of SO. 89 Third party concerns will 
therefore not be ameliorated with this review. So while the 
1996 Review Committee produced a thorough and largely 
workable set of rules for MMP, significant changes are still 
needed to suit the requirements of all parties in New 
Zealand's MMP Parliament. The evolutionary process is, at 
best, slow. 
APPENDIX 
BILL INTRODUCED 
Bill introduced 
during an 
adjournment* 
2nd Reading 
(for bills 
introduced 
during 
adjournment) 
... ,,, 
..... 
,, , ~ - 1 copy available 
1st Reading 
No debate 
,, , 
2nd Reading 
iv1ain debate 
,, , 
Sent to Select Committee 
for study and public submission 
Report on the bill presented to 
Clerk of the House 
~ - 2 copv available ., , . 
Debate on the consideration 
of the Report 
J ... Committee of the Whole House 
Lo------~,.. clause by clause consideration 
rr;s;:, - 3 copv available .,, ~ . 
3rd Reading 
cone luding debate 
Assent given: 
Bill becomes an Act 
Soure: Parliamentary Bulletin, Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
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